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Abstract Vertebrate wildlife damage management relates to developing and 
employing methods to mitigate against damage caused by wildlife in the areas of 
food production, property damage, and animal or human health and safety. Of the 
many management tools available, chemical methods (e.g., toxicants) draw the 
most attention owing to issues related to environmental burden, species specificity, 
and humaneness. Research and development focusing on RNA interference and 
gene drives may be able to address the technical aspects of performance goals. 
However, there remain many questions about regulation, environmental risk, and 
societal acceptance for these emerging biological technologies. Here we focus on 
the development and use of these biological technologies for use in vertebrate pest 
management and conservation (e.g., management of wildlife diseases). We then 
discuss the regulatory framework and challenges these technologies present and 
conclude with a discussion on factors to consider for enabling these technologies for 
pest management and conservation applications under a commercially applied 
framework.
Keywords Gene drive · Gene silencing · RNAi · Wildlife · Regulation · Product 
development · Pest control
L. Clark · J. Eisemann (*) · K. E. Horak · K. Oh · J. O’Hare · A. Piaggio · K. Pepin · E. Ruell 
National Wildlife Research Center, Wildlife Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Fort Collins, CO, USA
e-mail: john.d.eisemann@usda.gov 
J. Godwin 
Department of Biological Sciences, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA
194
 Introduction
The field of vertebrate wildlife damage management relates to developing and 
employing methods to mitigate damage caused by wildlife in the areas of food pro-
duction, property damage, and animal or human health and safety (Conover 2001). 
The methods used to resolve such conflicts include the use of physical devices (e.g., 
traps, sonic or visual scaring methods), chemical methods (e.g., reproductive inhibi-
tors, repellents, toxicants), direct lethal control (e.g., culling), and alterations to the 
landscape (e.g., habitat manipulation). Unlike other areas of wildlife management 
that involve natural resource protection for conservation or sustainable consumptive 
and nonconsumptive recreational use, wildlife damage management seeks to alter 
animal behavior or circumstances to prevent damage to human activity or interests 
that may be caused by wildlife and hence involve more direct and interactive 
approaches to management.
For the most part, the technologies and methods used by wildlife damage manag-
ers have long histories (Reidinger Jr and Miller 2013). Among the many manage-
ment tools, chemical toxicants have proven to be both effective and controversial 
(Eason et al. 2010). For the most part, criticism has focused on five areas: effective-
ness, need and/or alternatives, humaneness, nontarget effects, and environmental 
burden. Thus, imperative for managers in the development of new technologies is to 
consider developing methods that provide for sustainable agricultural production 
and natural resource stewardship within a social license framework.
If the use of vertebrate pesticides is required, then it is desirable for them to be 
species-specific, thus eliminating direct nontarget risks. The pesticide should also 
reduce environmental and ecological burden. That is to say, once the target effect is 
achieved, diffusion into the environment and amplification through the food chain 
should not occur, thus eliminating indirect nontarget effects. The mode of action for 
the pesticide should reduce animal awareness to pain and have a short time to death, 
both traits that contribute to current standards for humane death (Underwood et al. 
2013). As the science evolves and the options for mode of action and nature of the 
pesticide broaden, there should be regulatory clarity from authorizing agencies and 
guidance to users in the form of approved labeling and licensing of products. 
Because the research, development, and regulatory processes are complex and not 
necessarily familiar to wildlife damage managers, it is vital that communication 
among the developing partners is well founded and follows an orderly process so 
that formulation, effectiveness testing, technology transfer, production, delivery, 
and scalability result in a cost-effective product that is easily applied on a landscape 
scale. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is imperative that a communication 
and engagement plan is developed for users and the community. It does little good 
to develop an expensive tool only to have it fail because of unanticipated or unad-
dressed concerns within the human social and political framework.
Traditional strategies to control pest species include biological (use of predators, 
crop rotation), mechanical (physical removal), and chemical (toxicants, repellents). 
Biological and mechanical methods are often chosen to limit the use of chemicals 
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as a means to reduce impacts to the environment and nontarget species (Damalas 
and Eleftherohorinos 2011; Kogan 1998; Witmer 2007). Yet chemical methods may 
be favored because pest population control often occurs more quickly and with less 
monetary investment than when other techniques are used. More recently, research 
has focused on development of biological pesticides that combine target specificity, 
humaneness, and low environmental burden with the response and cost efficiencies 
of traditional chemical applications, such as gene drive technology and RNA inter-
ference. These technologies hold the promise to address the objectives identified 
above and perhaps decrease the reliance on use of chemical pesticides.
Here we focus on the development and use of two technologies that hold promise 
as tools for vertebrate wildlife management and conservation: gene silencing 
through RNA interference and gene drives.
 Gene Silencing
Interest in RNA interference (RNAi) as a tool for basic research and for the treat-
ment of diseases started with its discovery in the 1990s. Since then, the utility of 
RNAi as a means to control pest species has become increasingly popular. Successes 
in the development of RNAi toxicants to control insects and novel methods using 
plants as a means to deliver RNAi to feeding insects have expanded initial expecta-
tions of the applications of this technology. In 2017, the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) registered the first RNAi-based insecticide for the control 
of Western corn rootworm (Diabrotica virgifera virgifera). This EPA registration 
ushers in a new era in toxicant development with the ability to design toxicants that 
are species-specific alleviating concerns of risks to nontarget species, and following 
the promise shown for insect control, there is increasing interest for use of this tech-
nology for applications in vertebrate pest management.
RNA interference (RNAi) is a fundamental cellular process that controls what 
genes are turned on and off by determining what proteins are synthesized from the 
messenger RNA (mRNA) messages in the cytoplasm. RNAi shows promise as a 
class of species-specific toxicants because RNAi molecules, by design, bind specifi-
cally to a single mRNA triggering its destruction. The instructions for protein syn-
thesis travel from DNA in the nucleus to the cytoplasm by messenger RNA (mRNA) 
(Crick 1970). These single-stranded mRNA molecules are composed of unique 
sequences of nucleotides that code for specific proteins.
The first indication that translation from mRNA to protein may be influenced by 
exogenous RNA sequences came when Jorgensen (1998) attempted to increase the 
purple pigment in petunia flowers by injecting extra copies of the pigment gene into 
the plant. The result of these injections was not flowers that were more purple, but 
surprisingly yielded either two-toned or totally white flowers (Fire et  al. 1998; 
Jorgensen et al. 1998; Napoli et al. 1990). Jorgensen termed this phenomenon “co- 
suppression.” This was the first experimental demonstration of the process now 
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called RNA interference for which Andrew Z. Fire and Craig C. Mello were awarded 
a Nobel Prize in 2006.
RNAi is dependent on the inherent protective pathway within cells that degrades 
mRNA. Double-stranded RNA (dsRNA) binds to a protein called Dicer that cleaves 
the dsRNA into smaller fragments that are then integrated into the RNA-induced 
silencing complex, RISC (Liu et al. 2004; Tang 2005; Zhang et al. 2004). The RISC 
complex then separates the short dsRNA fragments into single-stranded segments, 
one of which is shuttled to and binds the matching mRNA sequencing that was 
transcribed from DNA. The complex formed by the RISC (with fragment of the 
initial dsRNA) and the mRNA then cleaves and degrades the mRNA guided by 
properties of the fragment of the initial dsRNA (Khvorova et  al. 2003; Schwarz 
et al. 2003). The gene for which the mRNA is coded is, therefore, not synthesized, 
and the gene is “silenced.” Since its discovery, this sequence-specific gene silencing 
has shown great promise as both a research tool and in the treatment of diseases 
(Lares et al. 2010). More recently, interest in using RNAi as a means to control pest 
species has become increasingly popular; however, to date, this interest has been 
focused on insect pests (Baum and Roberts 2014; Burand and Hunter 2013; Mamta 
and Rajam 2017; Niu et al. 2018; Zotti et al. 2018).
 Gene Silencing: Pest Control and Risk
The success of RNAi as a “chemical” means to control pest species depends on 
multiple factors. Though the RNAi pathways are inherently present in cells, intro-
duction of exogenous RNAi is still recognized as nonself and therefore can elicit an 
immune response and subsequent release of inflammatory cytokines (Alexopoulou 
et al. 2001; Heil et al. 2004). Responses such as these are called off-target effects as 
they are not related to the desired physiological response from the RNAi-induced 
gene silencing. Significant effort is made during the design of RNAi molecules to 
reduce off-target effects and minimize immune response (Schwarz et al. 2003). Off- 
target effects are a concern in nontarget species as they can occur even if the target 
sequence of the RNAi is not present in the nontarget animal. Nontarget species will 
not be affected by the directed silencing of specific genes, but the RNAi must not 
elicit an immune response in nontarget species. If successful, one of the benefits of 
RNAi over traditional chemical toxicants is its species specificity. Comparisons 
between gene sequences in target and nontarget species are done to determine 
regions of the genes that are the most different. RNAi molecules are then designed 
to those regions. These sequence differences result in a mismatch between the RNA 
incorporated in the RISC complex and the mRNA in the cytoplasm, blocking deg-
radation of the mRNA (Amarzguioui et  al. 2003). It is possible to design RNAi 
molecules that differ from target mRNA by a single nucleotide and therefore do not 
bind; purine/purine mismatches offer the highest level of discrimination (Schwarz 
et  al. 2006). Nucleotide mismatches in different regions of the RNAi also affect 
specificity, with the last two nucleotides of the same types of RNAi molecules not 
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contributing to binding to the mRNA (Elbashir et al. 2001), so mismatches in those 
regions do not affect binding and subsequent mRNA degradation. The requirement 
of exact matching of RNAi and target mRNA sequences places a burden on the 
development of RNAi-based chemical toxicants, as genes of wildlife species are 
often not sequenced. In addition, ensuring the target sequence in conserved diverse 
animal populations that are geographically separated needs to be done before 
sequences are registered for use as toxicants.
Using RNAi as a means to control pest populations is contingent on delivery of 
the nucleotide sequence to both the target species and the desired location in the 
organism. Toxicant baits containing RNAi face the same requirements as traditional 
chemical toxicant baits of attractiveness to target species and stability in harsh envi-
ronmental conditions. This is a challenge as RNAi is, by its nature, unstable. 
Modifications to the RNAi sequences, such as the addition of 2’-O-methylpurines 
or 2-fluoropyrimidines, have been shown to increase stability without decreasing 
effectiveness (Czauderna et al. 2003). Once the pest species consumes the RNAi 
bait, getting the RNAi to the target tissue in appropriate concentration becomes the 
next hurdle. RNAi baits will be formulated for oral delivery meaning the RNAi will 
have to survive the extreme conditions of the gastrointestinal tract before absorption 
into the systemic circulation. Lipid nanoparticle carriers have shown promise in 
protecting the RNAi from degradation at low digestive pH (Ball et al. 2018). Once 
in systemic circulation, the RNAi must get to the target location. This can be 
achieved through the addition of cell-type-specific ligands, antibodies, or receptors 
on the carrier molecule. Uptake of the RNAi by target cells can be facilitated by the 
use of cell-penetrating peptides, nanoparticles, and polymer-based delivery systems 
(Ahmadzada et al. 2018; Avila et al. 2016; Singh et al. 2018a, b). Once inside the 
cell, the RNAi will then silence the target gene by directed destruction of the mRNA.
There are numerous obstacles for delivery of an RNAi toxicant for use in verte-
brate pests, from the development of the oral bait to shuttling the RNAi to the target 
tissue. However, research from human drug development and successes in the fields 
of insect control lay the foundation for vertebrate RNAi toxicant development and 
wildlife disease treatments in the field.
 Gene Drives
Pest control technologies using RNAi have the potential to come to use sooner and 
under a clear regulatory framework (see below). Such technologies will also most 
likely be applied similar to traditional chemical pesticides. However, gene drive 
technologies hold the promise of being self-sustaining once released, thus eliminat-
ing the need for constant reapplication. It is this feature which is both appealing 
from an economic logistical perspective and warrants caution from an environmen-
tal risk perspective.
It is not difficult to find popular news stories about the promise and potential 
catastrophe that could be realized through the application of clustered regularly 
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interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) and CRISPR-associated proteins 
for genome editing and DNA. CRISPR-Cas systems have been identified from bac-
teria and archaea and provide immunity to ward off bacteriophages (Barrangou 
2015). When harnessed for genome editing, the system has been shown to provide 
targeted, sequence-specific cleavage of double-stranded DNA (Mali et  al. 2013; 
Jiang et al. 2013). This is accomplished through the precise delivery of endonucle-
ase enzymes by synthetic single-guide RNA (sgRNA) that are engineered to bind 
only to specific target sequences within the genome. These DNA cleavages will then 
be repaired by the targeted genome through either homology-directed repair (HDR) 
or nonhomologous end joining (NHEJ). HDR repairs with a homologue piece of 
DNA, whereas NHEJ directly ligates the cleaved pieces of DNA and thus can lead 
to a loss of nucleotides and other potential errors. With an engineered template, the 
HDR process will repair the nicked DNA with a synthetic portion of DNA on both 
DNA strands (Mali et al. 2013; Alphey 2014; Doudna and Charpentier 2014). Thus, 
through the CRISPR-Cas system, double-stranded DNA can be cleaved at a targeted 
site and repaired with a synthetic piece of DNA, which can then be copied in the 
organism through regular genomic copying. Application of this technology has been 
coined “synthetic biology,” and its utility has been realized in the pharmaceutical 
and agricultural production already (Carlson 2010; Church and Regis 2012; Doudna 
and Charpentier 2014; Gantz et al. 2015; Lander 2016; Hussain et al. 2018).
Because gene drive applications would not require constant application in the 
sense of traditional chemical pesticides or even RNAi, there is inherent appeal to 
managers that the management tool will be self-sustaining, whether for pest man-
agement or for control of disease susceptibility for wildlife conservation purposes, 
e.g., avian malaria for protection of birds or plague resistance for protection of 
endangered species.
 Gene Drives: Uses for Disease Mitigation
Disease control is typically accomplished by reductions in host or vector abun-
dance, reduction of contact between hosts and pathogens, or increase in the refrac-
toriness or resistance of hosts or vectors to infections (Sokolow et  al. 2019). 
Traditional techniques include host culling, pesticides for vector control, physical 
barriers between hosts and vectors, vaccination to reduce transmission, or treatment 
to reduce severity and transmission. All of these interventions can be expensive and 
time-consuming and have variable levels of effectiveness depending on ecological 
conditions. Pesticide application can present health risks to humans and domestic 
animals through contamination of soil or water supplies. Genetic modification 
(GM) techniques can be developed to target genes that could affect any of these 
processes and have the potential to be cheaper and more effective and have lower 
host or environmental burden. For example, GM approaches can be designed to 
target specific isolates or strains of a bacterium, which is advantageous over antibi-
otics because the specificity allows “good” bacteria to be unaffected (Barrangou and 
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Doudna 2016). Strain-specific editing of bacterial populations is particularly useful 
in food biotechnology where CRISPR systems have been used to vaccinate indus-
trial bacterial cultures against viruses or to engineer antibiotic resistance uptake or 
probiotic cultures (Selle and Barrangou 2015a, b). Similarly, it was recently shown 
that a CRISPR-Cas13a system could be used to engineer potato plants to be resis-
tant to potato virus Y while having no effect on related viruses such as potato virus 
A (Zhan et al. 2019). The ability to efficiently protect crops or livestock against 
specific agricultural diseases could dramatically improve food security while reduc-
ing the ecological footprint of agriculture (Herman et al. 2019; Van Eenennaam and 
Young 2014).
One of the most active areas of disease control research has been to create gene 
drives that repress vector populations or make them refractory to pathogens that 
cause human diseases such as dengue or malaria (Ferguson 2018; Shaw and 
Catteruccia 2019). For example, Anopheles stephensi, a vector of the malaria para-
site Plasmodium spp., has been successfully engineered to have much reduced vec-
tor competence relative to wild-type vector individuals (Gantz et al. 2015; Ito et al. 
2002). More recently, it has been demonstrated that a CRISPR-Cas9 system for 
delivery of a female sterility trait could spread to 100% prevalence in 7–11 genera-
tions in caged Anopheles mosquitoes (Kyrou et al. 2018). Similar results have been 
obtained using other gene targets (Hammond et al. 2016), suggesting that there is 
ample opportunity to choose a target that will be successful in a particular ecologi-
cal context (Champer et  al. 2016). While not yet realized, the ability to protect 
livestock against specific diseases efficiently using CRISPR technology is on the 
horizon (Conklin 2019; Lamas-Toranzo et al. 2017).
 Gene Drives: Uses for Conservation
Invasive mammalian predators represent a major threat to biodiversity worldwide. 
Doherty et al. (2016) estimated mammalian predators are responsible for the extinc-
tion of at least 142 vertebrate species since AD 1500 (58% of the total including 87 
bird, 45 mammal, and 10 reptile species) and threaten another 596 species. The key 
invasive vertebrate predator threats involve species from 13 mammalian families 
including rodents, felids, canids, and mustelids with seven species/groups in par-
ticular accounting for the bulk of the documented impacts on birds, mammals, and 
reptiles: cats, rodents, dogs, pigs, small Indian mongoose, red fox, and stoats. Of 
these, cats and rodents including three species of rats (Rattus spp.) and house mice 
(Mus musculus) have proven particularly damaging with island faunas being espe-
cially hard hit for several reasons. First, islands harbor a disproportionate share of 
biodiversity. Despite representing approximately 5% of the Earth’s land area, 
islands are home to 20% of described vertebrate species and approximately 40% of 
threatened and endangered species (Tershy et al. 2015; Spatz et al. 2017). Second, 
the populations of island endemic species are often much smaller and are therefore 
typically more vulnerable. Lastly, these island species have often evolved with few 
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or no predators and consequently lack adaptive antipredator defenses (Adler and 
Levins 1994; Cuthbert et al. 2016).
Because islands are hot spots for both biodiversity and threatened and endan-
gered species, managing threats in island ecosystems has also been a central focus 
for both conservationists and managers. In addition, for logistical reasons, islands 
represent isolated contained systems of limited geographic scale which will be criti-
cal for effective early phase testing and evaluation.
A major focus of efforts on islands has been eradication of invasive mammalian 
predators, and the outcomes have been tremendously positive (Cuthbert et al. 2011; 
Jones et  al. 2016). Despite the significant conservation benefits realized through 
traditional eradication approaches, primarily aerial broadcast of rodenticides when 
targeting rats and mice, these methods have both significant drawbacks and some 
fundamental limitations (Campbell et al. 2015, 2019). The drawbacks include high 
fixed costs for operations (often in the millions of US dollars), nontarget species 
exposure to toxicants, and animal welfare concerns for both target and nontarget 
species (Mackay et al. 2007; Holmes et al. 2015). Failures and other rationales can 
often lead to significant social and political opposition. Lastly and critically, apply-
ing toxicant-based methods is extremely challenging on islands with human inhab-
itants, which represent the majority of islands where invasive mammals threaten 
biodiversity. Indeed, Campbell et al. (2019) estimate that fewer than 15% of islands 
worldwide where invasive rodents threaten critically threatened or endangered spe-
cies are amenable to rodenticide-based eradication approaches. New approaches are 
clearly needed.
Genetic methods of pest control potentially offer a useful alternative to these 
established approaches. Although engineered gene drives harnessing either natural 
or synthetic drive mechanisms are still in the development phase, population model-
ing supports their potential effectiveness in reducing invasive mammal populations 
(Backus and Gross 2016; Prowse et  al. 2017, 2019; Sudweeks et  al. 2019). As 
detailed above, harnessing natural or synthetic selfish genetic elements in the form 
of gene drives could provide options not burdened by many of the drawbacks of 
rodenticide-based approaches. Specifically, genetic approaches could provide flex-
ibility in financial models relative to the high fixed costs of rodenticide-based eradi-
cations, where operations typically must be conducted within short time windows. 
Genetic approaches should also be species-specific, eliminating at least direct 
effects on nontarget organisms. A gene drive approach would likely affect target 
pest populations through either biasing offspring sex ratios or inducing infertility in 
drive carriers, thereby leading to population reduction through natural attrition. This 
could alleviate animal welfare concerns that arise from the mechanism of action of 
toxicants currently. The species specificity of genetic approaches could facilitate 
use on inhabited islands due to the reduced threat to humans, pets, and livestock. 
However, use on inhabited islands could raise other concerns, including increased 
potential for movement of gene drive carriers from the targeted island and introduc-
tion of resistant individuals onto an island from nontarget populations. These are 
also new, unfamiliar, and as yet untested and unproven technologies, so a great deal 
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of effort will need to be dedicated to engaging stakeholders and relevant publics in 
order to decide if, when, and how these approaches should be employed.
If a gene drive approach is employed for biodiversity conservation on islands, 
how is such an effort likely to proceed? While rats and cats represent more signifi-
cant overall threats to biodiversity and have been discussed as potential target organ-
isms for gene drive approaches (Moro et al. 2018), efforts to date have been focused 
on establishing feasibility in the house mouse. The feasibility of synthetic gene 
drive approaches has thus far only been demonstrated in insects and yeast (Gantz 
and Bier 2015; Gantz et al. 2015; Hammond et al. 2016; DiCarlo et al. 2015). The 
house mouse is the preeminent, most manipulable, and intensively studied mam-
malian genetic model organism with a rich knowledge base to support efforts to 
affect sex determination and fertility in this species (Campbell et  al. 2019). No 
functional synthetic gene drive has yet been described for a vertebrate, and a recent 
report suggests generating one could prove challenging (Grunwald et  al. 2019). 
Therefore, focusing on the most genetically tractable mammal is likely the best 
approach as well as advancing the general knowledge base necessary to advance 
efforts in other mammalian pest species should efforts in mice prove successful.
A number of factors including invasive species threaten terrestrial vertebrates 
worldwide (Allan et al. 2019). The foregoing discussion focused on use of genetic 
technologies on islands, which are favorable due to physical containment provided 
by geographic isolation. There is discussion of employing these technologies in a 
continental context and a recently launched effort to explore the potential of genetic 
approaches for controlling cats in Australia. Feral cats and red foxes represent the 
major current threat to Australia’s terrestrial mammal fauna (Woinarski et al. 2015), 
and existing control strategies are not equal to this challenge. This has prompted 
consideration of gene drive approaches for control of feral cats (Moro et al. 2018; 
Kinnear 2018). Key knowledge gaps remain, and advances in understanding the 
potential of gene drive approaches for cats and other species will likely depend on 
progress in implementing these approaches in rodents first.
 Gene Drives: Risk
There are several types of risk that must be considered in evaluating the potential 
utility of different pest control methods, such as ecological, evolutionary, economic, 
and ethical (Gould 2008). All methods of pest control share some risks in common 
(Herman et al. 2019). For example, reduction of pest populations can have ecologi-
cal consequences in terms of ecosystem maintenance or community ecology (Gould 
2008). Likewise, pesticide or repellant application or GM organisms can have eco-
nomic risks due to evolution of resistance by the pest or ecological risks through 
negative impacts on nontarget species. Any pest control method can pose ethical 
risks through negative effects on human health or belief systems. All types of risks 
should be thoroughly evaluated before a new technology can be applied.
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For innovative pest control approaches, the first type of risk assessment pursuits 
typically are: Will the method work to reduce pest populations? How can we make 
it work most efficiently? How will it affect nontarget species or the ecosystem? 
Research to answer these questions then ensues. However, for GM organisms, there 
is an additional layer of complexity: what research directions are safe and ethical 
(Collins 2018; Courtier-Orgogozo et  al. 2017)? The concept of GMOs, even for 
low-risk improvements to crop production, is not supported broadly in the human 
population (Linnhoff et al. 2017). It is important that differences in belief systems 
are thoroughly evaluated while defining research and technology directions for GM 
organisms (Shinwari et  al. 2017). Questions of safety and ethics also have been 
hotly debated in related fields such as studying gain-of-function mutations for 
potentially pandemic viruses (National Research Council 2015; Lipsitch 2018). The 
rationale is that, without better safeguards in place, the risk of releasing a syntheti-
cally engineered strain that could overcome natural barriers in the fitness landscape 
and cause widespread devastation is much greater than the potential benefits that 
could be gained by understanding this strain’s pathology and epidemiological 
dynamics. Similar concerns have arisen for GM pest control approaches, especially 
those with gene drive delivery (Abbasi 2016), because with super-Mendelian inheri-
tance, these GM methods present a high risk of uncontrolled spread of genes (Akbari 
et al. 2015; Backus and Gross 2016; Dhole et al. 2018; Esvelt et al. 2014) that could 
have devastating consequences on nontarget populations. Thus, the perceived eco-
logical risk of GM methods is so high that stringent containment conditions must be 
used even to study these methods in the laboratory (Benedict et al. 2018), and effects 
of these methods must be very well understood before they can proceed to con-
tained field trials. This poses a severe but necessary limitation on the rate at which 
the technology should advance (Abbasi 2016).
Most of the literature applicable to wildlife focuses on the use of CRISPR-Cas 
systems to produce a “gene drive” or to push a trait introduced into a wildlife popu-
lation to fixation or near fixation by avoiding Mendelian inheritance through inheri-
tance by all offspring (Champer et  al. 2016). This approach has been applied to 
some mosquito species that carry malaria that infects humans or Hawaiian birds and 
is being tested in laboratory and field experiments (Alphey 2014; Gantz et al. 2015; 
Hammond et al. 2016; Kyrou et al. 2018). In wildlife management, the application 
of this approach would need to be demonstrated in vertebrate species. This is a large 
technological leap from cells, insects, and even plants. However, the work of inves-
tigating the feasibility of CRISPR-Cas-mediated gene drives has begun in house 
mice (Piaggio et al. 2017; Grunwald et al. 2019) and thus holds promise for the 
control of invasive species and agricultural pests, which has been a promise of 
genetic engineering for over a decade (Burt 2003; Gould 2008).
Given the potential for synthetic gene drives to propagate rapidly within popula-
tions, the development of safeguards to spatially and temporally limit spread to 
nontarget organisms is a key technological challenge (Noble et al. 2018). Unlike 
most chemical-based management methods, RNA-guided gene drives are vertically 
transmitted, and thus, species-specificity is largely ensured by normal assortative 
mating among conspecifics. However, in many cases, the potential ecological 
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impacts of uncontrolled spread into wildlife populations outside of the treatment 
area may present an unacceptable risk (Gould 2008).
A second major risk factor that is currently poorly understood is potential evolu-
tion of a gene drive system. History has shown over and over that strong selection 
can repeatedly and predictably produce resistance in pest species – antimicrobial 
resistance is a primary example. For traits that strongly influence fitness, mutations 
that occur during propagation of a deleterious gene can rapidly predominate, espe-
cially if they confer a fitness advantage. This has recently been observed in labora-
tory experiments with fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster) to examine the efficiency 
of a CRISPR-Cas9 homing element for driving inheritance of a “Killer-Y chromo-
some” that results in all male offspring (KaramiNejadRanjbar et al. 2018). Here, 
gene-drive-resistant mutations readily arose in the mothers by in-frame indel muta-
tions in the recognition site of the guide RNA, and these drive-resistant alleles 
strongly impacted efficiency of the drive system (KaramiNejadRanjbar et al. 2018), 
posing a potential economic risk for use in the wild. However, evolution of resis-
tance could also pose ecological risks, and these mechanisms remain largely unex-
plored. For example, the mechanism by which a drive evolves could reduce target 
population specificity or even improve pest reproductive performance, thus increas-
ing the risk to nontargets or other ecosystem impacts. Exploring the evolutionary 
landscape of candidate gene drive mechanisms using experimental evolution and 
loss-of-function mutational analyses in high containment settings are critical risk 
assessment steps to take. Importantly, these experiments need to occur using the 
specific target species and gene drive mechanisms of interest because specific evo-
lutionary mechanisms can differ across systems.
In addition to experiments, risk assessment based on expert opinion (Beech et al. 
2009) can help to prioritize risk factors to be investigated in more detail, thus 
improving efficiency of risk assessment. Simulation models are another efficient 
and safe approach to risk assessment. Simulation models can help guide the design 
of experiments efficiently (Restif et  al. 2012) and improve our understanding of 
how different ecological and evolutionary processes interact to determine risk to 
nontarget individuals (Edgington and Alphey 2018). Models can be especially use-
ful in high-dimensional systems where it is infeasible to test all potential factors 
empirically. While models are not a substitute for experimental data, they can pre-
dict which characteristics of a GM system might be safest and most efficient in a 
given ecological context (Dhole et al. 2018; Gemmell et al. 2013), improving effi-
ciency of experimental design for risk assessment studies. Recent modeling work 
on examining the spread rates of gene drive systems in vertebrate pests shows that 
homing rates are an important characteristic of low-risk gene drive systems that 
confer high eradication probabilities of the pest species (Prowse et al. 2017). This 
work emphasizes that understanding factors that affect successful homing is a criti-
cal avenue for empirical research (Prowse et al. 2017). To date, models of gene drive 
systems have focused primarily on combined population genetic-dynamic models 
of a two-deme or island-mainland system (Dhole et al. 2018; Edgington and Alphey 
2018; Sudweeks et  al. 2019). However, individual-level spatial processes due to 
social structure or movement behavior, and mating structure, can have important 
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consequences for structuring genetic variation in space, suggesting that these are 
important future directions for models and experiments to explore.
 Gene Drives: Risk Mitigation
Several molecular strategies have been proposed to limit gene drive spread includ-
ing physical separation of gene drive components (“split drive”; DiCarlo et al. 2015) 
or gene drives that only function above a certain population frequency threshold 
(Buchman et al. 2018; Leftwich et al. 2018). Engineering the system such that there 
is a marker gene could also be useful for monitoring containment (Beech et  al. 
2009). Less efficient drive systems will be easier to contain than highly efficient 
systems (Dhole et al. 2018). Thus, a clear understanding of the potential spread rates 
for particular drive mechanisms is crucial for evaluating containment risk (Dhole 
et al. 2018). Containment risk in a target area will depend on the demographic and 
spatial dynamics of the pest species within the target zone (Edgington and Alphey 
2018; Wilkins et  al. 2018) and its connectivity to surrounding nontarget popula-
tions. Because measuring this risk in the field is in itself risky, important prelimi-
nary steps are to understand the ecological risk landscape in silico using simulations 
and experimental data collected in a virtual environment under stringent confine-
ment conditions (Abbasi 2016; Akbari et al. 2015).
Another promising approach capitalizes on the precise genome editing afforded 
by CRISPR-Cas systems to target locally unique sequences that are fixed in the 
population of interest (i.e., locally fixed alleles, LFA) but absent (or at low fre-
quency) in nontarget populations (Campbell et al. 2019). Evidence suggests that a 
single nucleotide change in the proto-spacer adjacent motif (PAM) associated with 
a sgRNA target site can be sufficient to preclude endonuclease binding (Hsu et al. 
2013). Thus, population specificity might be accomplished through designing 
sgRNA that bind genomic regions harboring polymorphisms that form a functional 
PAM site in the target populations, but not in nontarget populations. Recent model-
ing efforts (Sudweeks et al. 2019) demonstrate that such an approach can effectively 
achieve localized population suppression under a variety of scenarios. Interestingly, 
this work suggests that escape and interbreeding of gene-drive-bearing individuals 
out of the treatment area are likely to result in only transient suppression of nontar-
get populations, even when the “susceptible” (i.e., target) allele is present at high 
frequencies. This phenomenon is explained by the presence of “resistance” alleles 
(i.e., naturally occurring genetic variants that preclude gene drive homing) in non-
target populations that will be rapidly driven to high frequencies as a result of selec-
tion against drive-bearing individuals, subject to the assumptions of the model. This 
finding also emphasizes the critical importance of thorough population genetic 
evaluation of the target population prior to sgRNA design to identify sequences that 
are locally invariant, as even a low level of polymorphism would reduce effective-
ness of gene-drive-mediated population suppression. Likewise, both recent theoreti-
cal (Unckless et al. 2017) and empirical studies (Champer et al. 2017) suggest that 
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resistant alleles will inevitably arise spontaneously within populations from de novo 
mutations in the target site or by the gene drive itself as a consequence of errors in 
the cleavage repair process (e.g., NHEJ). One proposed solution to the evolution of 
resistance to gene drives is the design of drive systems with multiplexed sgRNA 
(Cong et al. 2013; Champer et al. 2018), that is, multiple sgRNA that each targets 
adjacent locally fixed alleles, wherein there is a low likelihood of resistance arising 
simultaneously in all targets. Indeed, evidence from modeling efforts suggests that 
multiplexed sgRNA is likely to be necessary for population suppression, even under 
low levels of NHEJ (Prowse et al. 2017).
The feasibility of the LFA strategy for gene drive containment in the context of 
vertebrate pest management will depend critically on several aspects of the popula-
tion structure and ecological setting. As gene drive effectiveness will be diminished 
by the influx of resistant individuals, relatively isolated populations with low levels 
of gene flow to nontarget populations, such as oceanic islands, would provide ideal 
settings. Small populations of introduced species, which are often founded by a 
small number of individuals, are also expected to harbor reduced allelic diversity, 
thereby providing a greater number of potential locally fixed allele targets (Morgan 
et al. 2018). Overall, it is clear that the success of the LFA approach will depend on 
rigorous population genetic survey of allelic variation within the target population 
prior to any action.
 Impacts and Effectiveness
The most straightforward measure of effectiveness of a pest control technique is to 
evaluate how rapidly it reduces the target pest population. However, determining the 
effects of control on the resources being protected relative to the effort invested is 
critical for choosing a technique with optimal effectiveness (Hone et al. 2017). Yet 
this “effort-outcomes relationship” is rarely reported or understood in vertebrate 
pest management (Hone et  al. 2018). The effort-outcomes relationship not only 
highlights how much effort is needed for a desired outcome but also can reveal 
which techniques are optimal. It provides additional information over effectiveness 
alone for choosing between techniques because there may be multiple techniques 
with the same outcome but with drastically different effort levels. For GM organ-
isms, once a technology is ready for application, there is potential for a much lower 
application cost than traditional methods (Herman et al. 2019), leading to a more 
favorable effort-outcome level relative to other techniques. Appropriately defining 
the dimensions of “effort” and “outcomes” in these comparisons is not straightfor-
ward, however, and is worthy of much consideration. For example, over what time 
scale do we measure outcomes? There may be downstream effects such as increased 
crop yield per hectare such that less land must be farmed to protect food security 
(Herman et al. 2019). This type of higher efficiency could also lead to lower farming 
effort over time, thus affecting a component of management effort (Herman et al. 
2019). Lastly, the measure of effectiveness needs to be defined based on the 
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management objective. For example, if we define our objective as maximum agri-
cultural sustainability with the smallest ecological footprint, then the optimal tech-
nique, or measure of effectiveness, might be different than if we define our objective 
simply as maximum crop yield.
Another important component of outcomes is “side effects” or “impacts” of a 
control method. Impacts of GM organisms could be beneficial such as reduced car-
bon emissions (Herman et al. 2019) or reduced health hazards from chemical expo-
sure. Alternatively, GM methods for pest control could alter the population genetics 
of an entire species, potentially causing unforeseen impacts on ecosystem function 
and stability. Defining and quantifying impacts are as complicated as defining effec-
tiveness and require a systematic decision framework for risk assessment involving 
multiple stakeholders (Sanvido et al. 2012).
 Regulatory Framework in the United States
A new era of genetic modification began in the 1970s with the generation of a new 
plasmid from DNA segments of two distinct plasmid species that was inserted into 
a bacterium (Escherichia coli) (Cohen et al. 1973). Questions soon arose regarding 
whether products derived from the new genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
would pose greater risks than those products achieved through traditional tech-
niques and whether the regulatory mechanisms were sufficient evaluate safety.
The distribution and use of almost all chemical and biological wildlife damage 
control products used to protect agriculture or to control invasive species are regu-
lated under a set of US federal statutes under the jurisdiction of one or more federal 
regulatory agencies. The three agencies that have regulatory authority over biotech-
nology products in the United States are the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA). These regulatory agencies have oversight of a broad spectrum 
of products, including GMOs, and subscribe to risk-based assessments to ensure 
human and environmental health. In some instances, the agency responsible for the 
regulation of a specific product is uncertain and requires a multiagency conference 
and decision as to the most appropriate agency or agencies best suited to provide 
regulatory oversight. Regulatory agencies sometimes have overlapping jurisdictions 
for a single product. Both of these situations may cause confusion and frustration 
for both the public and the regulated community and lead to a lack of confidence in 
the processes.
In an effort to stem these concerns, the US White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) formed a workgroup in 1984 to assess the existing regu-
latory mechanisms for their capability to ensure safety while also fostering a sup-
portive environment for technological development of new biotechnology products. 
The OSTP released the “Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology” 
in 1986 (OSTP 1986). The Coordinated Framework concluded that the existing 
laws address most health and safety regulatory processes for biotechnology 
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products. Further, the existing laws provide immediate regulatory oversight for the 
biotechnology industry, and the implementation of new laws would create uncer-
tainty disruptive to the advancement of new technologies and thus be 
counterproductive.
The Coordinated Framework was updated in 1992 to explain the federal regula-
tory agencies’ oversight roles and responsibilities as provided by statute, describe a 
science-based risk assessment process for oversight of biotechnology products 
released into the environment, and reaffirm that the regulatory oversight will focus 
“on the characteristics of the biotechnology product and the environment into which 
it is being introduced” and not whether the process employed to create the product 
is safe (Bromley 1992).
Federal regulatory agencies were directed by the Executive Office of the President 
in 2015 to further clarify their roles and responsibilities and to develop a strategy to 
ensure the regulatory processes are adaptable to scientific advances leading to new 
types of products. The Emerging Technologies Interagency Policy Coordination 
Committee Biotechnology Working Group was formed to develop the strategy and 
update the Coordinated Framework. The result was the National Strategy for 
Modernizing the Regulatory System for Biotechnology Products was released in 
2016 (OSTP 2019). The Strategy’s priorities are to increase transparency, increase 
predictability and efficiency, and support the science that underpins the regulatory 
system. The goals of the updated Coordinated Framework, issued in 2017, were to 
increase public understanding and confidence in the regulatory system and “to pre-
vent unnecessary barriers to innovation and competitiveness.” The statutory authori-
ties and roles of the FDA, EPA, and USDA were again reaffirmed (OSTP 2016, 2017).
The FDA has broad statutory authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) over human food and animal feed including pesticide resi-
dues, drugs, cosmetics, and biological products. Genetically engineered animals are 
regulated under the drug provisions with exceptions including GMO mosquitoes 
intended only for mosquito population control. Drugs are defined in statue as “arti-
cles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of 
man or other animals” (21 CFR § 321).
Early research in vertebrate species focused on the genetic modification of 
domestic animals for the production of human drugs. This precedent formed a natu-
ral fit for FDA to regulate all genetically engineered animals irrespective of the 
genetic alteration. Other genetically engineered organisms regulated under the 
FDCA are human and animal foods derived from non-pesticidal GM plants and 
human drugs, biological products, and medical devices derived from GE sources. It 
is important to note that FDA regulates the genetic construct and not the ani-
mal itself.
All pesticides registered, distributed, and used in the United States are regulated 
by EPA under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 
The EPA definition of a pesticide is “any substance (or group of structurally similar 
substances if specified by the Agency) that will prevent, destroy, repel or mitigate 
any pest, or that functions as a plant regulator, desiccant, or defoliant…” with spe-
cific exceptions provided in 40 CFR § 174.3. Under this authority, EPA regulates 
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three major classes of pesticides: conventional, microbial, and biopesticides. 
Historically, all pesticides were regulated under a single framework. In time, micro-
bial pesticides and biopesticides were split from conventional pesticides, and each 
is now regulated under their own respective requirements more suited to their for-
mulations and uses. GMO pesticides include microbes modified to produce a pesti-
cide, crops tolerant to specific herbicides, plant-incorporated protectants (PIP) that 
express pesticidal properties, and most recently mosquitoes genetically engineered 
to control a pest. In addition to FIFRA, EPA has authority to regulate the allowable 
level of pesticide residues allowed in food and feed under the FDCA.
Several agencies within the USDA exercise authority over certain plants and 
animals, food and feed, and products intended to mitigate plant and animal disease, 
all of which may include biotechnology products. The USDA’s statutory authority 
is provided by the Plant Protection Act (PPA, Public Law 106–224), Animal Health 
Protection Act (AHPA, Pub. L. 107–171, 116 Stat. 494, 7 U.S.C. 8301), and the 
Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (VSTA, 21 USC 151–159). The USDA Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has regulatory oversight under PPA and AHPA 
over biotechnology products that are considered plant pests or noxious weeds and 
livestock pests including but not limited to those that cause disease. The USDA 
Center for Veterinary Biologics has regulatory authority under VSTA over veteri-
nary biological products to prevent, diagnose, and treat disease in animals. Several 
other statutes are administered by the USDA Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS).
In summary, primary regulatory authority is determined by how the various fed-
eral laws define the different classes of products, which is based on their intended 
use, composition, route of administration, and mechanism of action rather than the 
technology used to create them (Ruell et  al. 2016; OSTP 2017; Wozniak 2018). 
These regulatory laws also encompass completely novel biotechnologies or novel 
uses of existing technologies that alter the structure or function of organisms, unless 
they have already been specifically exempted by law or agency rulemaking (OSTP 
2017; Wozniak 2018). All three of the federal agencies have shared roles and 
responsibilities that require coordination (Table  1). In particular, the USDA and 
FDA often coordinate due to overlapping jurisdiction, but development of these 
newer technologies emphasizes the challenges for regulatory agencies to adapt 
existing regulatory frameworks to this changing technological landscape.
The different agencies charged with regulating these products have developed 
different sets of standards and requirements based on the particularities of the 
underlying laws they are charged with implementing (Ruell et  al. 2016; OSTP 
2017). Therefore, early knowledge of a potential product’s regulatory situation is 
crucial for researchers when determining the feasibility of gaining authorization for 
the product and in order to comply with and meet the relevant regulatory require-
ments during the research and development phase. Any field testing of experimental 
products usually requires some form of authorization from the agency with primary 
regulatory jurisdiction. In addition, notification and authorization are also often 
required prior to importing, exporting, or interstate transporting of experimental 
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Table 1 Summary of pesticide category, claims, characteristics, and application method






eradication of a target 
vertebrate pest through 
reproduction of the edited 
animal with wild 
individuals to produce 
predominantly male, 





release of live 
individuals to breed 
with target vertebrate 
pest
Edited to sire 
predominantly male, 
infertile, or inviable 
offspring
With or without gene 
drive
Vertebrate pest is native 
or invasive










Edited to produce the 
product (a substance)
Environmental 
release of the live 
invertebrates to be 
consumed by target 
vertebrate pest (oral 
application)
Product is not 
harvested, but rather is 
applied as a release of 
the live invertebrate
Not a pest under the 
LHPAa
Not a plant pest under 
the Plant Protection Act 
(PPA)a
Oral application of 
dead invertebrate




application to target 
vertebrate pest
Product is harvested 
from and applied apart 
from the invertebrate 
itself
Not a pest under the 
LHPAa





Kill a target vertebrate pest Designed to cause 
disease (target- 




application to target 
vertebrate pest
Not a pest under the 
LHPAa
Not a plant pest under 
the PPAa
(continued)
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products. Conventional wildlife damage products with clear regulatory precedents 
are relatively easy to classify under the different regulatory jurisdictions.
 Regulatory Framework: Gene Silencing Using RNAi
The regulatory framework for the new generation of RNAi-based pesticides would 
likely follow the general guidelines for biopesticides, which are modified from con-
ventional pesticides (OSTP 1986). If applied to growing crops, the FDA ensures the 
food from crops containing RNAi is as safe as its conventional counterpart. The 
USDA ensures there is no risk to agriculture from the use of RNAi. The EPA ensures 
that the product can perform its intended function with a reasonable certainty of no 
harm to people from dietary and residential exposure and no unreasonable risks to 
the environment.
Table 1 (continued)
Product category Product claim Product characteristics Application method
Substance causing 
RNA interference
Kill or contracept a target 
vertebrate pest
Designed to cause 
degradation of mRNA 
and prevent translation 
of a specific protein 
(target-specific) within 















Oral or inhalation 
application to target 
vertebrate pest
Nanorobotics used to 
deliver pesticide to 
target organ
Substance causing 
change in sensory 
organ perception 
or ill feeling
Repel a target vertebrate 
pest from the food, forage, 
or prey through aversive 
conditioning
Causes unpleasant 
sensory feedback or 




foods, forage, or prey
Oral, dermal, 
inhalation 
application to target 
vertebrate pest
Device combined 
with a substance 
that causes 
infertility
Contracept a target 
vertebrate pest
Contraceptive Insertion into a 
female reproductive 
body cavity
aWould not fall under USDA APHIS regulatory authority
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 Regulatory Framework: Gene Editing
Regulatory jurisdiction of novel GM products for wildlife damage control can be 
more difficult to classify and may require prolonged consultation between the regu-
latory agencies themselves before a final designation is made. As an example, prod-
ucts consisting of microorganisms or invertebrates, whether unmodified or modified 
(including GM), which are used to change the structure or function of animals, have 
been on the market for some time, and, for the most part, are now distributed among 
the regulatory agencies (Wozniak et al. 2012; Ruell et al. 2016; FDA CVM 2017a, 
b; OSTP 2017; EPA OPP 2018; Wozniak 2018). They are regulated by USDA based 
on whether they qualify as a pest to livestock as defined by the AHPA or as a veteri-
nary biologic as defined by VSTA.  They are regulated by EPA if they or their 
byproducts are used as pesticides against pests as defined by FIFRA. Any other 
product that uses microorganisms with the intent to directly change the structure or 
function of animals is regulated by FDA.
In contrast, products consisting of vertebrate animals fall into much different 
regulatory classifications that are not as clear cut. Non-GM vertebrate animals 
released to control a pest species, aka biological control agents (e.g., the release of 
mongooses to control rats on islands), do not qualify as products requiring authori-
zation under the FDCA and have been exempt from the registration requirements of 
FIFRA by EPA (40 C.F.R. § 152.20(a)(3)). However, EPA has left the door open to 
revoke this exemption for any biological control agent it considers to be inade-
quately regulated by other federal agencies (40 C.F.R. § 152.20(a)(2)). In contrast, 
GM vertebrate animals do fall under the provisions of the FDCA, or more accu-
rately, the intentionally altered genomic DNA within the GM animal becomes the 
regulated article because it changes the structure of function of the animal for an 
intended purpose (FDA CVM 2015, 2017a; OSTP 2017). This intentionally altered 
genomic DNA in a GM vertebrate animal is not currently classified as a regulated 
article under the AHPA, VSTA, or FIFRA, although a substance produced by a GM 
vertebrate animal could be regulated separately by another agency if it meets their 
definition of a regulated article (FDA CVM 2015; Ruell et al. 2016; FDA CVM 
2017a). Several GM vertebrate animal products have made their way through part 
of or the whole approval process with FDA to date (e.g., GE salmon, chickens, 
goats), although none so far were designed for use in wildlife damage control or 
pest management (EPA OPP 2018).
It is possible that the Congress or FDA and EPA may one day determine that 
certain GM vertebrate animals intended for population control of vertebrate pests 
will be classified as pesticides and regulated under FIFRA instead of under the pro-
visions of the FDCA, similar to GM mosquitos intended solely for mosquito popu-
lation control (FDA CVM 2017b). The two agencies have started working together 
to determine statutory authority over these types of GM animal products for pest 
management on the horizon, but it is unclear whether this will change their regula-
tory jurisdiction in the near future (EPA OPP 2018). Until alternative guidance is 
issued by FDA and EPA, the primary regulatory authority over all GM vertebrate 
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animals will remain FDA (FDA CVM 2017a; OSTP 2017). FDA will work closely 
with EPA and other federal regulatory agencies charged with implementing envi-
ronmental laws before authorizing any experimental field use or eventual approval 
of these novel products (FDA CVM 2017a). FDA recommends that product devel-
opers contact them early in the development phase of product development of GM 
vertebrates (FDA CVM 2017a).
There can be significant disadvantages for developers submitting the first prod-
uct of its kind to a regulatory agency that result in unforeseen delays and costs prior 
to authorization. Many agencies, including EPA, will convene Scientific Advisory 
Panels at the expense of the applicant to help them determine how to appropriately 
evaluate the risk of the novel product type and the appropriate set of regulatory data 
they will require from the registrant prior to authorization (EPA OPP 2018). Once 
the agency’s risk assessment process has been determined, study guidelines must 
then be developed and finalized for each data requirement. However, they will not 
usually initiate these processes until after they receive an application or information 
on an actual product, because these processes take considerable time and resources.
There is also the potential that a novel product could change regulatory hands 
midstream in the regulatory authorization process or even after a product has been 
authorized by an agency, like what happened with GE mosquitos used for mosquito 
population control, and this can pose additional difficulties and added costs for the 
applicant. For example, data that were collected or contracted for one authorization 
process may not be directly applicable or adequate for the next. The manufacturing 
and National Environmental Policy Act requirements for the product also differ 
depending on the agency and regulatory statute. Some regulatory statutes allow 
government agencies to take products through the full authorization process, and 
some require a private or nonprofit entity to be the applicant. Thus, last minute 
changes to the regulatory jurisdiction of a product can result in considerable chal-
lenges for the product developer in predicting the practicality and use timeline for 
novel products such as GM vertebrate animals used in animal damage control.
 Translational Product Development
Translational product development can be thought of as a pipeline or continuum as 
an idea moves from research and development to fully implemented product or 
technique. Figure  1 graphically illustrates that pipeline for a regulated product. 
Early in the process, pilot and confirmatory development steps are undertaken to 
provide the information needed to assess the product development costs, market 
potential, and ultimately the viability of the product. Early in the product develop-
ment pipeline, decisions are normally made regarding protecting intellectual prop-
erty and the need to form development and commercialization partnerships. In the 
case of regulated products such as a pesticide, biologic, vaccine, or drug, a realistic 
assessment must be made as to the cost of regulatory studies and the time it will take 
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to obtain a product authorization. All of these aspects inform decisions in advancing 
development efforts.
As this chapter outlines, developments in our ability to manipulate or target the 
genetic code of an organism have opened up an entirely new world for product 
development. The application of genetic tools appears to be boundless in advancing 
medical, agricultural, and conservation goals. At the heart of biotechnology product 
development is the decision and ability to protect the intellectual property. To illus-
trate this, two potential biotech techniques or tools that will prove useful in agricul-
tural production and conservation will be briefly presented. Both of these 
technologies, gene silencing and gene editing, share the same general product 
development pipeline but have significant variations along that path.
 Intellectual Property Protection
At the heart of translational product development is technology transfer and, if 
appropriate, protection of intellectual property. There are many definitions of tech-
nology transfer, but in essence, it is the process by which technology or knowledge 
developed in one place or for one purpose is applied in and used in another place 
(FLC 2006). Two conditions are responsible for initiating or accomplishing technol-
ogy transfer, a technology is created and pushed into practice, or some identified 
need creates the opportunity for a new technology. Regardless of what initiated the 
product development effort, the successful transfer from development to practice is 
the goal. An idea, technique, or tool is underutilized until it is put into practice.
Patent protection from the US Patent and Trademark Office or other international 
patent authorities can be a major driver of technology transfer. Patent protection 
allows the patent owner to exclusively pursue the development of the patented tool 
or technique or to license the rights to practice the patent to another entity, typically 
for a fee. As advances in genetic technologies allowed us to sequence genomes and 
identify specific genome sequences that were responsible for specific physiological 
functions, scientists and businesses sought patent protection of gene sequences they 
had identified in the hopes of capitalizing on those discoveries and future 
Fig. 1 Conceptual product development pipeline for regulated products developed in a federal 
laboratory
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applications of that knowledge. The idea of patenting naturally occurring genetic 
code quickly became a hotly debated topic. Many found the idea of “owning” the 
knowledge of a person’s genetic code unethical. Despite the debate, 4300 patents 
were issued for the human genome alone prior to 2013. In 2012, the US Supreme 
Court ruled that DNA in its natural form cannot be patented; however, DNA manip-
ulated in a lab is eligible to be patented because DNA sequences altered by humans 
are not found in nature (NIH 2017, 2019; SCOTUS 2013). While this ruling closed 
the door on capitalizing on a person’s genetic code, it defined what was allowed to 
be patented and provides the guidance for those seeking intellectual property pro-
tection for intentionally modified genetic tools.
 Intellectual Property: Gene Silencing Using RNAi
As previously described, the ability to intentionally prevent or inhibit normal RNA 
translation has profound impacts on an organism’s physiological function and has 
enormous potential to be utilized in human medicine, agricultural production, and 
many other beneficial areas. An example of a gene-silencing tool for agricultural 
protection is the development of new pest management tools, such as active ingre-
dients used in pesticides. Typical pesticides function by disrupting a biochemical 
mechanism critical to life. Common biochemical mechanisms include, but are not 
limited to, cholinesterase inhibitors, which function by inhibiting nerve impulse 
transmission across synaptic junctions, and other pesticides disrupt the production 
of ATP by impacting enzyme production critical to normal Krebs cycle functions. 
Gene silencing could target similar critical functions but at the genetic level, by 
introducing engineered strands of RNA into the cell, which disrupt translation or 
transcription processes.
Taking advantage of an organism’s unique genetic code could potentially lead to 
the development of species-specific, humane pesticides with reduced risk of unin-
tended environmental or human health consequences. Such an approach could revo-
lutionize pest management, leading to dramatic advances in agricultural and human 
health protection, and associated economic benefits to protected resources in addi-
tion to significant economic benefits to companies advancing these technologies. 
For these reasons, there will be a great desire to protect the intellectual property 
behind the technologies. Patenting is available for gene-silencing tools because the 
patented technology would not be based on the native genetic code or an organism, 
but rather on the man-made genetic sequences introduced into cells which disrupt 
normal RNA translation or transcription processes. In the case of pest management, 
most of these types of products would be regulated as pesticides by the US 
EPA. Consequently, there is clear understanding of the regulatory path these prod-
ucts would face. Even though this line of product development is high risk, having 
regulatory clarity paves the way for clear product development efforts.
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 Intellectual Property: Gene Editing
Directly editing the genetic sequence of an organism has the potential for significant 
contributions to agriculture, human health, and natural resource protection. As 
described above, the discovery of native CRISPR-Cas systems and the knowledge 
of how to utilize these systems to make specific gene edits have revolutionized our 
ability to produce single-generation designer organisms. Current lines of research 
are focused on developing gene-edited organisms that pass the desired trait to a high 
proportion of their offspring in a way that it is active in subsequent generations, 
known as “gene drive” systems. Driving a trait through a population has enormous 
social implications and elicits very controversial discussions, especially when it 
could be applied to natural resource conservation issues. Despite those important 
discussions, work will continue to develop applications of gene-edited and gene 
drive organisms because associated economic benefits are presumed to be high. If 
the resulting products include unnatural genetic sequences in an organism, there is 
a potential for seeking patent protection.
The decision to protect intellectual property is only one step of the technology 
transfer pipeline. The ultimate proof that product development efforts were success-
ful is seeing that technology adopted somewhere in society. However, an important 
consideration is that the ultimate landing place of a technology may not be what the 
original researchers and product developers intended.
 Future Directions
Wildlife damage conflicts continue to increase as the world’s population increases. 
Generally speaking, mitigation of a conflict implies an active management or con-
trol program. Typically, conflicts manifest themselves as invasive species and dis-
ease impacts on native ecosystems and damage caused by wildlife to commodities 
of value to humans (e.g., agriculture, property, health, safety, property). Managers 
must weigh the options available to them to mitigate the conflict in terms of eco-
nomics, effectiveness, environmental effects, and humaneness, all within a social 
framework. A question becomes whether today’s technologies will be well suited to 
constraints and problems we may face into the future. For example, will today’s 
reliance on chemical pesticides continue into the future, and if not, what mitigation 
tools and strategies will replace these methods? Like many new technologies that 
were introduced in the past, there is great promise and apprehension about these 
new genetically based methods in terms of development and use. Herein, we 
reviewed the context, opportunities, and challenges of genetically based biopesti-
cides and provided some social, technical, and regulatory practicalities in research 
and development for technologies such as gene silencing and gene drives. The 
encouraging news is that the scope and depth of discussions are vigorous and 
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inclusive (e.g., scientists, ethicists, managers, regulators, the public, and policy 
makers), all of which bodes well for informed decision processes.
Acknowledgments This work was supported in part by the US Department of Agriculture’s 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. The findings and conclusions in this publication are 
those of the authors and should not be construed to represent any official USDA or US Government 
determination or policy.
References
Abbasi J (2016) National Academies hit the brakes on gene drive–modified organisms. JAMA 
316:482–483. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2016.8830
Adler GH, Levins R (1994) The island syndrome in rodent populations. Q Rev Bio 69:473–490
Ahmadzada T, Reid G, McKenzie DR (2018) Fundamentals of siRNA and miRNA therapeutics 
and a review of targeted nanoparticle delivery systems in breast cancer. Biophys Rev 10:69–86
Akbari OS, Bellen HJ, Bier E, Bullock SL, Burt A, Church GM, Cook KR, Duchek P, Edwards 
OR, Esvelt KM, Gantz VM (2015) Safeguarding gene drive experiments in the laboratory. 
Science 349:927–929. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aac7932
Alexopoulou L, Holt AC, Medzhitov R, Flavell RA (2001) Recognition of double-stranded RNA 
and activation of NF-κB by toll-like receptor 3. Nature 413:732
Allan JR, Watson JE, Di Marco M, O’Bryan CJ, Possingham HP, Atkinson SC, Venter O (2019) 
Hotspots of human impact on threatened terrestrial vertebrates. PLoS Biol. https://journals.
plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.3000158
Alphey L (2014) Genetic control of mosquitoes. Annu Rev Entomol 59:205–224
Amarzguioui M, Holen T, Babaie E, Prydz H (2003) Tolerance for mutations and chemical modi-
fications in a siRNA. Nucleic Acids Res 31:589–595
Avila LA, Aps LR, Ploscariu N, Sukthankar P, Guo R, Wilkinson KE, Games P, Szoszkiewicz R, 
Alves RPS, Diniz MO, Fang Y (2016) Gene delivery and immunomodulatory effects of plas-
mid DNA associated with branched Amphiphilic peptide capsules. J Control Release 241:5–24
Backus GA, Gross K (2016) Genetic engineering to eradicate invasive mice on islands: modeling 
the efficiency and ecological impacts. Ecosphere 7. https://doi.org/10.1002/ecs2.1589
Ball RL, Bajaj P, Whitehead KA (2018) Oral delivery of siRNA lipid nanoparticles: fate in the GI 
tract. Sci Rep 8:2178
Barrangou R (2015) The roles of CRISPR–Cas systems in adaptive immunity and beyond. Curr 
Opin Immunol 32:36–41
Barrangou R, Doudna JA (2016) Applications of CRISPR technologies in research and beyond. 
Nat Biotechnol 34:933
Baum JA, Roberts JK (2014) Progress towards RNAi-mediated insect Pest management. In: 
Dhadialla TS, Gill SS (eds) Advances in insect physiology. Academic Press, New  York, 
pp 249–295
Beech CJ, Nagaraju J, Vasan SS, Rose RI, Othman RY, Pillai V, Saraswathy TS (2009) Risk analy-
sis of a hypothetical open field release of a self-limiting transgenic Aedes aegypti mosquito 
strain to combat dengue. APJMBB 17:97–108
Benedict MQ, Burt A, Capurro ML, De Barro P, Handler AM, Hayes KR, Marshall JM, Tabachnick 
WJ, Adelman ZN (2018) Recommendations for laboratory containment and management of 
gene drive systems in arthropods. Vector-Borne Zoonotic Dis 18:2–13. https://doi.org/10.1089/
vbz.2017.2121
Bromley A (1992) Exercise of federal oversight within scope of statutory authority: planned intro-
ductions of biotechnology products into the environment. White house, Office of Science and 
technology policy (OSTP). Fed Regist 57:6753–6762
L. Clark et al.
217
Buchman AB, Ivy T, Marshall JM, Akbari OS, Hay BA (2018) Engineered reciprocal chromo-
some translocations drive high threshold, reversible population replacement in Drosophila. 
ACS Synthc Bio 7:1359–1370
Burand JP, Hunter WB (2013) RNAi: future in insect management. J Invertebr Path 112:S68–S74
Burt A (2003) Site-specific selfish genes as tools for the control and genetic engineering of natural 
populations. Proc R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 270:921–928
Campbell KJ, Beek J, Eason CT, Glen AS, Godwin J, Gould F, Holmes ND, Howald GR, Madden 
FM, Ponder JB, Threadgill DW (2015) The next generation of rodent eradications: innovative 
technologies and tools to improve species specificity and increase their feasibility on islands. 
Biol Conserv 185:47–58
Campbell KJ, Saah JR, Brown PR, Godwin J, Gould F, Howald GR, Piaggio A, Thomas P, Tompkins 
DM, Threadgill D, Delborne J, Kanavy DM, Kuiken T, Packard H, Serr M, Shiels A (2019) A 
potential new tool for the toolbox: assessing gene drives for eradicating invasive rodent popula-
tions. In: Veitch CR, Clout MN, Martin AR, Russell JC, West CJ (eds) Island invasives: scaling 
up to meet the challenge, Occasional Paper SSC no. 62. IUCN, Gland, pp 6–14
Carlson RH (2010) Biology is technology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, p 288
Champer J, Buchman A, Akbari OS (2016) Cheating evolution: engineering gene drives to manip-
ulate the fate of wild populations. Nat Rev Genet 17:146–159
Champer J, Reeves R, Oh SY, Liu C, Liu J, Clark AG, Messer PW (2017) Novel CRISPR/Cas9 
gene drive constructs reveal insights into mechanisms of resistance allele formation and drive 
efficiency in genetically diverse populations. PLoS Genet 13(7). https://doi.org/10.1371/jour-
nal.pgen.1006796
Champer J, Liu J, Oh SY, Reeves R, Luthra A, Oakes N, Clark AG, Messer PW (2018) Reducing 
resistance allele formation in CRISPR gene drive. PNAS 115:5522–5527
Church GM, Regis E (2012) Regenesis: how synthetic biology will reinvent nature and ourselves. 
Basic Books, New York, p 284
Cohen SN, Chang AC, Boyer HW, Helling RB (1973) Construction of biologically functional bac-
terial plasmids in vitro. PNAS 70:3240–3244. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.70.11.3240
Collins JP (2018) Gene drives in our future: challenges of and opportunities for using a self- 
sustaining technology in pest and vector management. BMC Proc 12:9. https://doi.org/10.1186/
s12919-018-0110-4
Cong L, Ran FA, Cox D, Lin S, Barretto R, Habib N, Hsu PD, Wu X, Jiang W, Marraffini LA, Zhang 
F (2013) Multiplex genome engineering using CRISPR/Cas systems. Science 339:819–823
Conklin BR (2019) On the road to a gene drive in mammals. Nature 566:43–45. https://doi.
org/10.1038/d41586-019-00185-y
Conover MR (2001) Resolving human-wildlife conflicts: the science of wildlife damage manage-
ment. CRC press, New York
Courtier-Orgogozo V, Morizot B, Boëte C (2017) Agricultural pest control with CRISPR- 
based gene drive: time for public debate. EMBO Rep 18:878–880. https://doi.org/10.15252/
embr.201744205
Crick F (1970) Central dogma of molecular biology. Nature 227:561
Cuthbert RJ, Visser P, Louw H, Rexer-Huber K, Parker G, Ryan PG (2011) Preparations for the 
eradication of mice from Gough Island: results of bait acceptance trials above ground and 
around cave systems. Wildl Res 38:196–203
Cuthbert RJ, Wanless RM, Angel A, Burle MH, Hilton GM, Louw H, Visser P, Wilson JW, Ryan 
PG (2016) Drivers of predatory behavior and extreme size in house mice Mus musculus on 
Gough Island. J Mammal 97:533–544
Czauderna F, Fechtner M, Dames S, AyguÈn H, Klippel A, Pronk GJ, Giese K, Kaufmann J (2003) 
Structural variations and stabilising modifications of synthetic siRNAs in mammalian cells. 
Nucleic Acids Res 31:2705–2716
Damalas CA, Eleftherohorinos IG (2011) Pesticide exposure, safety issues, and risk assessment 
indicators. Int J Environ Res Public Health 8:1402–1419
Invasive Species Control and Resolution of Wildlife Damage Conflicts: A Framework…
218
Dhole S, Vella MR, Lloyd AL, Gould F (2018) Invasion and migration of spatially self-limiting 
gene drives: a comparative analysis. Evol Appl 11:794–808. https://doi.org/10.1111/eva.12583
DiCarlo JE, Chavez A, Dietz SL, Esvelt KM, Church GM (2015) Safeguarding CRISPR-Cas9 
gene drives in yeast. Nat Biotechnol 33:1250–1255
Doherty TS, Glen AS, Nimmo DG, Ritchie EG, Dickman CR (2016) Invasive predators and global 
biodiversity loss. PNAS 113:11261–11265
Doudna JA, Charpentier E (2014) The new frontier of genome engineering with CRISPR-Cas9. 
Science 346:1258096
Eason CT, Fagerstone KA, Eisemann JD, Humphrys S, O’Hare JR, Lapidge SJ (2010) A review 
of existing and potential New World and Australasian vertebrate pesticides with a rationale for 
linking use patterns to registration requirements. Int J Pest Manag 56:109–125
Edgington MP, Alphey LS (2018) Population dynamics of engineered underdominance and 
killer-rescue gene drives in the control of disease vectors. PLOS Comput Bio 14. https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006059
Elbashir SM, Martinez J, Patkaniowska A, Lendeckel W, Tuschl T (2001) Functional anatomy 
of siRNAs for mediating efficient RNAi in Drosophila melanogaster embryo lysate. EMBO J 
20:6877–6888
EPA OPP (2018) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs, November 
1. Biotechnology/Emerging Technologies Seminar. https://register.gotowebinar.com/
register/6494848564946662914
Esvelt KM, Smidler AL, Catteruccia F, Church GM (2014) Emerging technology: concerning 
RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations. elife 3. https://doi.org/10.7554/
eLife.03401
FDA CVM (2015) U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Veterinary Medicine, June. 
#187 Guidance for industry on regulation of genetically engineered animals containing heri-
table recombinant DNA constructs. https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20170111005939/
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/
GuidanceforIndustry/UCM113903.pdf
FDA CVM (2017a) U.S.  Food and Drug Administration, Center for Veterinary Medicine, 
January. Draft Guidance: #187 Guidance for industry on regulation of intentionally 
altered genomic DNA in animals. http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/
GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM113903.pdf
FDA CVM (2017b) U.S.  Food and Drug Administration, Center for Veterinary Medicine, 
October. #236 Clarification of FDA and EPA Jurisdiction Over Mosquito-Related Products. 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/
GuidanceforIndustry/UCM533600.pdf
Ferguson NM (2018) Challenges and opportunities in controlling mosquito-borne infections. 
Nature 559:490. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0318-5
Fire A, Xu S, Montgomery MK, Kostas SA, Driver SE, Mello CC (1998) Potent and specific 
genetic interference by double-stranded RNA in Caenorhabditis elegans. Nature 391:806
FLC (2006) FLC technology transfer desk reference: a comprehensive introduction to technology 
transfer. Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer, Cherry Hill, NJ. http://ictt.
by/Rus/Portals/0/T2_Desk_Reference_2006.pdf
Gantz VM, Bier E (2015) The mutagenic chain reaction: a method for converting heterozygous to 
homozygous mutations. Science 348:442–444
Gantz VM, Jasinskiene N, Tatarenkova O, Fazekas A, Macias VM, Bier E, James AA (2015) 
Highly efficient Cas9-mediated gene drive for population modification of the malaria vector 
mosquito Anopheles stephensi. PNAS 112:E6736–E6743
Gemmell NJ, Jalilzadeh A, Didham RK, Soboleva T, Tompkins DM (2013) The Trojan female 
technique: a novel, effective and humane approach for pest population control. Proc R Soc B: 
Bio Sci 280:20132549. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.2549




Grunwald HA, Gantz VM, Poplawski G, Xu XRS, Bier E, Cooper KL (2019) Super-Mendelian 
inheritance mediated by CRISPR–Cas9 in the female mouse germline. Nature 566:105
Hammond A, Galizi R, Kyrou K, Simoni A, Siniscalchi C, Katsanos D, Gribble M, Baker D, 
Marois E, Russell S, Burt A (2016) A CRISPR-Cas9 gene drive system targeting female repro-
duction in the malaria mosquito vector Anopheles gambiae. Nature Biotechnol 34:78–83
Heil F, Hemmi H, Hochrein H, Ampenberger F, Kirschning C, Akira S, Lipford G, Wagner H, 
Bauer S (2004) Species-specific recognition of single-stranded RNA via toll-like receptor 7 
and 8. Science 303:1526–1529
Herman RA, Zhuang M, Storer NP, Cnudde F, Delaney B (2019) Risk-only assessment of 
genetically engineered crops is risky. Trends Plant Sci 24:58–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
tplants.2018.10.001
Holmes ND, Griffiths R, Pott M, Alifano A, Will D, Wegmann AS, Russell JC (2015) Factors 
associated with rodent eradication failure. Bio Conserv 185:18–16
Hone J, Drake VA, Krebs CJ (2017) The effort–outcomes relationship in applied ecology: evalua-
tion and implications. Bio Science 67:845–852
Hone J, Drake VA, Krebs CJ (2018) Evaluating wildlife management by using principles of applied 
ecology: case studies and implications. Wildlife Res 45:436–445
Hsu PD, Scott DA, Weinstein JA, Ran FA, Konermann S, Agarwala V, Li Y, Fine EJ, Wu X, Shalem 
O, Cradick TJ (2013) DNA targeting specificity of RNA-guided Cas9 nucleases. Nature 
Biotechnol 31:827
Hussain W, Mahmood T, Hussain J, Ali N, Shah T, Qayyum S, Khan I (2018) CRISPR/Cas system: 
a game changing genome editing technology, to treat human genetic diseases. Gene 685:70
Ito J, Ghosh A, Moreira LA, Wimmer EA, Jacobs-Lorena M (2002) Transgenic anopheline 
mosquitoes impaired in transmission of a malaria parasite. Nature 417:452–455. https://doi.
org/10.1038/417452a
Jiang W, Bikard D, Cox D, Zhang F, Marraffini LA (2013) RNA-guided editing of bacterial 
genomes using CRISPR-Cas systems. Nature Biotechnol 31:233
Jones HP, Holmes ND, Butchart SH, Tershy BR, Kappes PJ, Corkery I, Aguirre-Muñoz A, 
Armstrong DP, Bonnaud E, Burbidge AA, Campbell K (2016) Invasive mammal eradication 
on islands results in substantial conservation gains. PNAS 113:4033–4038
Jorgensen RA, Atkinson RG, Forster RL, Lucas WJ (1998) An RNA-based information superhigh-
way in plants. Science 279:1486–1487
KaramiNejadRanjbar M, Eckermann KN, Ahmed HM, Dippel S, Marshall JM, Wimmer EA (2018) 
Consequences of resistance evolution in a Cas9-based sex conversion-suppression gene drive 
for insect pest management. PNAS 115:6189–6194. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1713825115
Khvorova A, Reynolds A, Jayasena SD (2003) Functional siRNAs and miRNAs exhibit strand 
bias. Cell 115:209–216
Kinnear JE (2018) Mammal conservation and invasive species control in Australia: harnessing a 
potential extinction machine. Aust Mammal 40:131–135
Kogan M (1998) Integrated Pest management: historical perspectives and contemporary develop-
ments. Annl Rev Entomol 43:243–270
Kyrou K, Hammond AM, Galizi R, Kranjc N, Burt A, Beaghton AK, Nolan T, Crisanti A (2018) 
A CRISPR–Cas9 gene drive targeting doublesex causes complete population suppression in 
caged Anopheles gambiae mosquitoes. Nature Biotechnol 36:1062–1066
Lamas-Toranzo I, Guerrero-Sánchez J, Miralles-Bover H, Alegre-Cid G, Pericuesta E, Bermejo- 
Álvarez P (2017) CRISPR is knocking on barn door. Reprod Domest Anim 52:39–47. https://
doi.org/10.1111/rda.13047
Lander ES (2016) The heroes of CRISPR. Cell 164:18–28
Lares MR, Rossi JJ, Ouellet DL (2010) RNAi and small interfering RNAs in human disease thera-
peutic applications. Trends Biotechnol 28:570–579
Leftwich PT, Edgington MP, Harvey-Samuel T, Paladino LZC, Norman VC, Alphey L (2018) 
Recent advances in threshold-dependent gene drives for mosquitoes. Biochem Soc Trans 
46:1203–1212
Invasive Species Control and Resolution of Wildlife Damage Conflicts: A Framework…
220
Linnhoff S, Volovich E, Martin H, Smith M (2017) An examination of millennials’ attitudes toward 
genetically modified organism (GMO) foods: is it Franken-food or super-food? IJARGE 
13:371–390. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJARGE.2017.088403
Lipsitch M (2018) Why do exceptionally dangerous gain-of-function experiments in 
influenza? In: Influenza virus. Humana Press, New  York, pp  589–608. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-1-4939-8678-1_29
Liu J, Carmel MA, Rivas FV, Marsden CG, Thomson JM, Song JJ, Hammond SM, Joshua- 
Tor L, Hannon GJ (2004) Argonaute2 is the catalytic engine of mammalian RNAi. Science 
305:1437–1441
MacKay JWB, Russell JC, Murphy EC (2007) Eradicating house mice from islands: successes, 
failures and the way forward. In: Witmer GW, Pitt WC, Fagerstone KA (eds) Managing verte-
brate invasive species. Proceedings of an international symposium, Fort Collins, pp 294–304
Mali P, Yang L, Esvelt KM, Aach J, Guell M, DiCarlo JE, Norville JE, Church GM (2013) RNA- 
guided human genome engineering via Cas9. Science 339:823–826
Mamta B, Rajam MV (2017) RNAi technology: a new platform for crop pest control. Physiol Mol 
Bio Plants 23:487–501
Morgan AP, Didion JP, Hughes JJ, Searle JB, Jolley WJ, Campbell KJ, Threadgill DW, Manuel 
de Villena FP (2018) Genetic characterization of invasive house mouse populations on small 
islands. BioRxiv. https://doi.org/10.1101/332064
Moro D, Byrne M, Kennedy M, Campbell S, Tizard M (2018) Identifying knowledge gaps for gene 
drive research to control invasive animal species: the next CRISPR step. Glob Ecol Conserv 13. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gecco.2017.e00363
Napoli C, Lemieux C, Jorgensen R (1990) Introduction of a chimeric chalcone synthase gene into 
petunia results in reversible co-suppression of homologous genes in trans. Plant Cell 2:279–289
National Research Council (2015) Potential risks and benefits of gain-of-function research: sum-
mary of a workshop. National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/21666
NIH (2017) Intellectual property and genomics. National Institute of Health, Bethesda, MD. https://
www.genome.gov/19016590/
NIH (2019) Help Me Understand Genetic Testing. Lister Hill National Center for Biomedical 
Communications. National Institute of Health. Bethesda MD, March 19, 2019. https://ghr.nlm.
nih.gov/primer/testing.pdf
Niu J, Taning CNT, Christiaens O, Smagghe G, Wang JJ (2018) Rethink RNAi in insect Pest con-
trol: challenges and perspectives. In: Smagghe G (ed) Advances in insect physiology, vol 2018. 
Academic Press, pp 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aiip.2018.07.003
Noble C, Adlam B, Church GM, Esvelt KM, Nowak MA (2018) Current CRISPR gene drive 
systems are likely to be highly invasive in wild populations. elife 7. https://doi.org/10.7554/
eLife.33423
OSTP (1986) Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, 
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology. 122 p. 51 FR 23302. https://www.
aphis.usda.gov/brs/fedregister/coordinated_framework.pdf
OSTP (2016) Executive Office of the President, National Strategy for Modernizing the Regulatory 
System for Biotechnology Products, p 14 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/microsites/ostp/biotech_national_strategy_final.pdf
OSTP (2017) Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, 
Modernizing the Regulatory System for Biotechnology Products: Final Version of the 2017 
Update to the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology. 51 F.R. 23302-93. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2017_coordinated_
framework_update.pdf
OSTP (2019) Executive order on modernizing the regulatory framework for agricul-




Piaggio AJ, Segelbacher G, Seddon PJ, Alphey L, Bennett EL, Carlson RH, Friedman RM, Kanavy 
D, Phelan R, Redford KH, Rosales M (2017) Is it time for synthetic biodiversity conservation? 
Trends Ecol Evol 32:97–107
Prowse TA, Cassey P, Ross JV, Pfitzner C, Wittmann TA, Thomas P (2017) Dodging silver bullets: 
good CRISPR gene-drive design is critical for eradicating exotic vertebrates. Proc R Soc B Bio 
ScI 284:20170799
Prowse TA, Adikusuma F, Cassey P, Thomas P, Ross JV (2019) A Y-chromosome shredding gene 
drive for controlling pest vertebrate populations. eLife 8:e41873. https://doi.org/10.7554/
eLife.41873
Reidinger RF Jr, Miller JE (2013) Wildlife damage management: prevention, problem solving, and 
conflict resolution. JHU Press, Baltimore
Restif O, Hayman DTS, Pulliam JRC, Plowright RK, George DB, Luis AD, Cunningham AA, 
Bowen RA, Fooks AR, O’Shea TJ, Wood JLN, Webb CT (2012) Model-guided fieldwork: 
practical guidelines for multidisciplinary research on wildlife ecological and epidemiological 
dynamics. Ecol Lett 15:1083–1094
Ruell EW, Gatewood DM, O’Hare JR, Eisemann JE (2016) A decision support tool for determin-
ing federal regulatory authority over products for vertebrate animals. Proc Vertebr Pest Conf 
27:422–431
Sanvido O, Romeis J, Gathmann A, Gielkens M, Raybould A, Bigler F (2012) Evaluating envi-
ronmental risks of genetically modified crops: ecological harm criteria for regulatory decision- 
making. Environ Sci Pol 15:82–91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2011.08.006
Schwarz DS, Hutvágner G, Du T, Xu Z, Aronin N, Zamore PD (2003) Asymmetry in the assembly 
of the RNAi enzyme complex. Cell 115:199–208
Schwarz DS, Ding H, Kennington L, Moore JT, Schelter J, Burchard J, Linsley PS, Aronin N, Xu 
Z, Zamore PD (2006) Designing siRNA that distinguish between genes that differ by a single 
nucleotide. PLoS Genet 2:e140. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgen.0020140
SCOTUS (2013) Association for Molecular Pathology et  al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. et  al. 
Supreme Court of the United States. Decided June 13, 2013. https://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/12pdf/12-398_1b7d.pdf
Selle K, Barrangou R (2015a) CRISPR-based technologies and the future of food science. J Food 
Sci 80:R2367–R2372
Selle K, Barrangou R (2015b) Harnessing CRISPR–Cas systems for bacterial genome editing. 
Trends Microbio 23:225–232
Shaw WR, Catteruccia F (2019) Vector biology meets disease control: using basic research to fight 
vector-borne diseases. Nature Microbio 4:20–34. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41564-018-0214-7
Shinwari ZK, Tanveer F, Khalil AT (2017) Ethical issues regarding CRISPR-mediated genome 
editing. Cris Syst Emerg Technol Appl 26:103–110. https://doi.org/10.21775/cimb.026.103
Singh A, Trivedi P, Jain NK (2018a) Advances in siRNA delivery in cancer therapy. Artif Cells 
Nanomed Biotechnol 46:274–283
Singh T, Murthy AS, Yang HJ, Im J (2018b) Versatility of cell-penetrating peptides for intracellular 
delivery of siRNA. Drug Deliv 25:1996–2006
Sokolow SH, Nova N, Pepin KM, Peel AJ, Pulliam JRC, Manlove K, Cross PC, Becker DJ, 
Plowright RK, McCallum H, De Leo Giulio A (2019) Ecological interventions to pre-
vent and manage zoonotic pathogen spillover. Phil Trans R Soc B. https://doi.org/10.1098/
rstb.2018.0342
Spatz DR, Zilliacus KM, Holmes ND, Butchart SH, Genovesi P, Ceballos G, Tershy BR, Croll DA 
(2017) Globally threatened vertebrates on islands with invasive species. Sci Adv 3(10). https://
doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.1603080
Sudweeks J, Hollingsworth B, Blondel DV, Campbell KJ, Dhole S, Eisemann JD, Edwards O, 
Godwin J, Howald GR, Oh K, Piaggio AJ, ProwseTAA RJV, Saah JR, Shiels AB, Thomas P, 
Threadgill DW, Vella MR, Gould F, Lloyd A (2019) Locally fixed alleles: a method to localize 
gene drive to island populations. Sci Rep 9:15821. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-51994-0
Tang G (2005) siRNA and miRNA: an insight into RISCs. Trends Biochem Sci 30:106–114
Invasive Species Control and Resolution of Wildlife Damage Conflicts: A Framework…
222
Tershy BR, Shen KW, Newton KM, Holmes ND, Croll DA (2015) The importance of islands for 
the protection of biological and linguistic diversity. Bioscience 65:592–597
Unckless RL, Clark AG, Messer PW (2017) Evolution of resistance against CRISPR/Cas9 gene 
drive. Genetics 205:827–841
Underwood W, Anthony R, Cartner S, Corey D, Grandin T, Greenacre CB, Gwaltney-Bran S, 
McCrackin MA, Meyer R, Miller D (2013) AVMA guidelines for the euthanasia of ani-
mals: 2013 edition. American Veterinary Medical Association, Schaumburg, IL.  ISBN 
978-1-882691-21-0
Van Eenennaam AL, Young AE (2014) Prevalence and impacts of genetically engineered feedstuffs 
on livestock populations. J Anim Sci 92:4255–4278. https://doi.org/10.2527/jas2014-8124
Wilkins KE, Prowse TA, Cassey P, Thomas PQ, Ross JV (2018) Pest demography critically deter-
mines the viability of synthetic gene drives for population control. Math Biosci 305:160–169. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mbs.2018.09.005
Witmer G (2007) The ecology of vertebrate pests and integrated pest management (IPM). In: 
Kogan M, Jepson P (eds) Perspectives in ecological theory and integrated pest management. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp 393–341
Woinarski JC, Burbidge AA, Harrison PL (2015) Ongoing unraveling of a continental fauna: decline 
and extinction of Australian mammals since European settlement. PNAS 112:4531–4540
Wozniak CA (2018) Regulatory avenues at US EPA for products of novel breeding technologies. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs. http://cropbioengineer-
ing.iastate.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2-Day2_Wozniak.pdf
Wozniak CA, McClung G, Gagliardi J, Segal M, Matthews K (2012) Regulation of genetically 
engineered microorganisms under FIFRA, FFDCA and TSCA. In: Regulation of agricultural 
biotechnology: the United States and Canada. Springer, Dordrecht, pp  57–94. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-94-007-2156-2_4
Zhan X, Zhang F, Zhong Z, Chen R, Wang Y, Chang L, Bock R, Nie B, Zhang J (2019) Generation 
of virus-resistant potato plants by RNA genome targeting. Plant Biotechnol J 17:1814–1822
Zhang H, Kolb FA, Jaskiewicz L, Westhof E, Filipowicz W (2004) Single processing center mod-
els for human Dicer and bacterial RNase III. Cell 118:57–68
Zotti M, dos Santos EA, Cagliari D, Christiaens O, Taning CNT, Smagghe G (2018) RNA inter-
ference technology in crop protection against arthropod pests, pathogens and nematodes. Pest 
Managt Sci 74:1239–1250
L. Clark et al.
